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A Report Card on the Quality of Commercial Arbitration:
Assessing and Improving Delivery of the Benefits
Customers Seek
Hon. Curtis E. von Kann*
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflicts in life are inevitable. They occur in virtually every
sphere-between employers and employees, labor and management,
buyers and sellers of consumer goods and services, business allies and
enemies, even between lovers (or so the poets tell us). While the inci-
dence of conflicts sometimes can be reduced by well-conceived con-
flict-avoidance strategies, many conflicts persist.
The real question is not whether conflicts will occur but rather how
they can best be resolved. Thus, business entities entering into trans-
actions generally include provisions for the resolution of potential dis-
putes in the contracts. Such provisions often mandate mediation (or
negotiation between executives, then mediation) as the initial dispute
resolution process; a substantial percentage of conflicts get resolved
through such methods. For conflicts not settled through negotiation or
mediation, some form of adjudication is necessary. Trial by combat
having been outlawed centuries ago, the choice is chiefly between liti-
gation and arbitration. Each process has advantages and disadvan-
tages. Those involved in each process would benefit by periodically
assessing the quality of the process in which they participate. This arti-
cle assesses the arbitration process currently utilized for the resolution
of disputes between business entities in the United States.'
Appraising quality is often a tricky and subjective exercise. Arbitra-
tion, in which merit is frequently in the eye of the beholder, is no
exception. The most appropriate way to assess the quality of the pre-
sent commercial arbitration process is to determine the benefits
* Retired Judge, District of Columbia Superior Court. Currently a full-time Arbitrator and
Mediator in the Washington, DC Office of JAMS and President-Elect of the College of Com-
mercial Arbitrators.
1. Similar assessments could be made of arbitration in the much different contexts of employ-
ment, consumer, labor, and international business disputes, but such efforts are beyond the
scope of this article.
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sought by the parties engaged in domestic commercial arbitration,2
and the extent to which these benefits are actually achieved. Part II
identifies the ten principal benefits parties seek to achieve through
commercial arbitration. Part III considers how well the current com-
mercial arbitration process delivers on those benefits, and assigns a
grade for each perceived benefit. Part IV renders an overall assess-
ment of the quality of commercial arbitration as of 2009, and proposes
solutions to current problems.
II. WHAT BENEFITS Do USERS OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION SEEK?
In the last few years, commercial arbitration, once the darling of the
business community, has lost some of its allure. Some have predicted a
decline in the resolution of disputes through arbitration because its
use is said to take as long and cost as much as litigation.3 Whether
such asserted parity is accurate is considered below. However, if the
cost and duration of arbitration and litigation are equal, then neither
factor can support a rational choice of one method over the other.
Instead, other attributes of the processes will determine which method
to employ.
The principal reasons traditionally cited 4 for choosing arbitration,
listed in the approximate chronological order in which they are exper-
ienced, are:
1. The ability to choose the decision-maker;
2. The ability to adapt the process to the needs of each individual
case;
3. Flexibility in the adjudicative process;
4. Privacy of the adjudicative process;
5. Accessibility of the decision-maker;
6. Efficient, user-friendly case administration;
7. Fair and just results;
8. Finality of the decision;
2. Commercial arbitration in this article is defined as arbitration between U.S. commercial
entities.
3. Mary Swanton, System Slowdown: Can Arbitration be Fixed?, INSIDE COUNSEL, May 2007,
at 51, available at www.insidecounsel.com; Lou Whiteman, Arbitration's Fall From Grace,
LAw.CoM: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL, July 13, 2006, available at http://www.law.com.
4. Michael T. Burr, The Truth About ADR: Do Arbitration And Mediation Really Work?, 2/04
CoRP,. LEGAL TIMES 44 (col. 1) (2004); Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, International
Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People,
A Forced Rank Analysis, 30 IrN'L. Bus. LAW. 203 (2002); American Arbitration Association,
Dispute-Wise Business Management: Improving Economic and Non-Economic Outcomes in
Managing Business Conflicts, (2006); David B. Lipsky & Roland L. Seeber, The Appropriate
Resolution of Corporate Disputes: A Report on the Growing Use of ADR by U.S. Corporations,
CORNELL INST. ON CONFLICT RESOL. (1998).
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9. Lower costs than litigation; and
10. Quicker results than litigation.
Some elaboration of each of these benefits aids in determining how
well the perceived benefit is (or is not) currently being achieved in
practice.
A. Choosing the Decision-Maker
Parties litigating disputes generally have little ability to choose who
will decide them. In most state and federal courts, cases are randomly
assigned to a particular judge. This judge may have been an accom-
plished civil litigator with extensive experience in business disputes, or
a former criminal attorney with virtually no experience in such mat-
ters. The attempts of some litigators to get the judge they want
through various "judge-shopping" strategies are successful only spo-
radically as courts (and litigation opponents) generally seek to thwart
such efforts. In cases decided by juries, parties can exercise challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury a lim-
ited number of persons believed (whether or not correctly) to be un-
sympathetic to a party's position. However, litigants are restricted to
eliminating jurors from the pool that confronts them; they have no
ability to add the people they would like to decide their case to that
pool. Arbitration reputedly offers parties a greater ability to choose
their decision-maker.
B. Customizing the Process for Each Case
Any civil case currently litigated in an American state or federal
court is conducted under the same rules of procedure and evidence as
every other civil case in that court. These standardized rules establish
a "level playing field" for all litigants, provide a predictable process,
and give rise to a body of publicly available precedents interpreting
those rules. The disadvantage of standardized rules is that the parties
and tribunal are precluded from customizing the adjudicative process
to suit the particular circumstances and needs of their individual cases.
Since arbitration is wholly a creature of party agreement, arbitrating
parties are said to have the opportunity to prescribe in their agree-
ment the exact procedures to be followed in resolving their disputes.
C. Flexibility of the Adjudicative Process
Adjudicating disputes at the courthouse has some built-in limita-
tions. The hearing must be held where the court sits. If the case is
being tried to a jury, the hearing must generally be conducted on suc-
cessive business days (with perhaps a day or two off if the judge has a
2009]
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conflicting matter scheduled); it is not possible to recess a jury trial for
some weeks or months and later resume the trial. Even in non-jury
trials, judges are under pressure to promptly dispatch their cases and
clear their dockets, and it is the rare case in which a bench trial can be
suspended once or more for extended periods of time. Arbitration is
supposedly a more flexible process.
D. Privacy of the Adjudicative Process
Many business entities are not eager to have their disputes aired
and resolved in public. Businesses fear that such publicity may have
various adverse consequence, such as depressing the value of their
stock, discouraging other businesses or customers from dealing with
them, damaging their public image, or encouraging other parties to
sue them concerning similar or related matters. In nearly all civil liti-
gation today, every paper filed in the case is a matter of public record,
and every trial and hearing is open to the public. Absent national se-
curity risks or other compelling circumstances, most state and federal
courts are unwilling to seal records of civil litigation, even if requested
to do so by all parties. Courts are publicly funded governmental insti-
tutions exercising the government's power to resolve disputes, and
most judges believe that the interests of transparency and accountabil-
ity in the performance of governmental functions outweigh the desires
of private litigants to keep their affairs private.
Those choosing to resolve their disputes in court, at the taxpayer's
expense, effectively give up the right to keep their disputes private.
Arbitration, on the other hand, is a private dispute resolution process
funded by the participants. Proponents of arbitration claim that it af-
fords much greater privacy than litigation.
E. Accessibility of the Tribunal
In arbitration and litigation, particularly in complex cases with mul-
tiple claims and parties, many pre-hearing issues may arise that can
substantially delay resolution of the matter. Discovery disputes can
bog down a case. Medical complications can require the rescheduling
of hearings or trials. Difficulties in obtaining necessary evidence from
non-parties may prolong proceedings. New developments may require
the adjustment of existing schedules or arrangements. The cost and
duration of a case can be affected by how quickly counsel can commu-
nicate with the tribunal about such matters and get them resolved.
Arbitration supposedly provides the parties with greater accessibility
to the tribunal than litigation.
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F. Responsive and Helpful Case Administration
Whether in litigation or arbitration, a case must be administered to
be adjudicated. Claims and defenses need to be filed and served. Fil-
ing fees need to be paid. Conference calls and hearings need to be
scheduled and arranged. Decisions need to be transmitted to affected
parties. Parties who frequently are already stressed over the substance
of their disputes do not relish being further stressed by incompetent,
unresponsive, or surly administrative personnel. Thus, many users of
commercial arbitration seek the ability to obtain responsive and help-
ful case administrative services from the organizations providing arbi-
tration services (usually referred to as "providers").
G. Fair and Just Results
Many businesses do not see juries as the optimum vehicle for
resolving business disputes. They believe, with some justification, that
while jurors may be well-suited to applying common sense (and a
good nose for lying) to criminal cases and simple civil cases, they are
less well-suited to deciding complex cases involving numerous techni-
cal and sophisticated issues, voluminous evidence, intricate jury in-
structions, and long trials which may impose financial and scheduling
burdens. The parties read of "runaway juries" and verdicts that seem
grossly disproportionate to the actual damages at issue. And they rec-
ognize that many everyday citizens, who compose the bulk of juries,
are often unsympathetic or downright hostile to large corporations.
Even having judges decide disputes via non-jury trials is unappeal-
ing to business entities. Many judges in state and federal courts had
little or no experience with civil disputes before taking the bench.
Many have overwhelming dockets and inadequate time to carefully
sift through large volumes of evidence or explore complex or novel
legal issues. Some judges have no law clerks or access to heavy-duty
legal research. Parties who are uncomfortable entrusting their fate to
juries but want multiple minds to hear and reflect on the evidence and
engage in collaborative decision-making cannot achieve that goal in
court, where bench trials are usually decided by a single jurist.
A survey conducted by the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") in 2002 found that, among commercial clients and attor-
neys, the most important reason for choosing arbitration was the ex-
pectation of fair and just results.5 That expectation related not only to
the actual outcome but also to how it was reached-in essence, getting
a right result in the right way.
5. Naimark & Keer, supra note 4.
2009]
504 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
H. Finality
Ever since Charles Dickens described in Bleak House6 the seem-
ingly interminable Chancery Court case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce,
parties have been frustrated by the public court system's apparent in-
ability to end civil litigation. Appeals, remands, retrials, and more ap-
peals have stretched litigation to ten years or more. While this
characteristic of the court system springs from a salutary desire to
greatly reduce the incidence of error, expedition and finality are sacri-
ficed. For some parties, particularly business entities that need to get
on with their business, that price is too high. To obtain a prompt and
final end to their disputes, such parties are willing to accept some risk
that the decision-maker will get it wrong. Since the parties pick the
decision-maker, they believe the risk is tolerable.
Thus, a principal selling point for arbitration has always been that,
after a full and fair hearing, an award is rendered which brings the
dispute to a close. Unless the parties choose to include a provision in
their arbitration agreement under which that award can be reviewed
by an appellate panel of arbitrators, which is seldom done, the arbitra-
tion proceedings are over. Vacatur of the award by a court is possible
but has historically happened in only a small percentage of cases.
I. Less Cost than Litigation
A major claimed benefit of arbitration is its ability to deliver dis-
pute resolution at a lower cost than litigation. While the payment of
arbitrator and provider fees and expenses adds cost items not present
in litigation, those items usually comprise a modest portion of the to-
tal cost of the adjudication. In both arbitration and litigation of busi-
ness disputes, the biggest cost item by far is attorney's fees and costs.
A process reducing that cost item, even if partially offset by payments
to the arbitrators and administering organization, is much less costly
than litigation. Arbitration is thought to deliver such a process.
J. Faster Results than Litigation
For most of the same reasons discussed in the preceding section,
commercial arbitration has traditionally been thought of as producing
a resolution faster than litigation. This is regarded as a significant
complimentary benefit for users.
6. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Penguin Books 1996) (1853).
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III. ARE CUSTOMERS GETTING THE BENEFITS THEY SEEK?
Providing a report card for commercial arbitration is not an easy
task. The quality of decisions and administrative services, flexibility of
the adjudicative process, and accessibility of the decision-maker are
inevitably subjective. Even for claimed benefits capable of objective
measurement (e.g., lower costs or faster results than litigation), no
such measurements have been published. Surveys of users of commer-
cial arbitration (typically consisting of questionnaires completed by
general counsel or outside counsel) have been published, but the sta-
tistical significance of the results is unclear. 7 Many articles discuss
what particular authors see as problems,8 but these articles are fre-
quently based on limited experience and individual "pet peeves."
Consequently, until better data becomes available, assessments (like
this article) are inevitably impressionistic and personal.
So readers can decide how much weight to give the conclusions
reached in this article, the author notes this article is based upon vari-
ous surveys and articles deemed to be perceptive and sound as well as
his professional experience. This experience includes sixteen years as
a civil litigator with several large law firms, ten years as a judge on the
busy general jurisdiction trial court for Washington, DC, and twelve
years as a full-time arbitrator and mediator with JAMS, the nation's
largest Alternative Dispute Resolution company. This article is also
informed by the author's previous discussions with other Fellows of
the College of Commercial Arbitrators, a select society composed of
nearly 200 leading commercial arbitrators from North America.
A. Choosing the Decision-Maker (Grade = A)
No one has seriously questioned that arbitration affords parties a
much greater opportunity to choose their decision-maker than litiga-
tion. If arbitrating parties can agree that their dispute should be de-
cided by a particular person or persons willing and available to do so,
7. For example, International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2008, a Price-
WaterhouseCoopers study published by the University of London's Queen Mary School of In-
ternational Arbitration reported that "86% of participating counsel said they are satisfied with
International Arbitration." Michael McIlwrath, general counsel of a leading international com-
pany, immediately challenged that finding as completely contrary to the widespread dissatisfac-
tion expressed by numerous corporate counsel with whom he had spoken. See Michael
McIlwrath & Roland Schroeder, International Arbitration: In Dire Need of Early Resolution, 74
ARBITRATION 3-11 (2008).
8. Sylvia Hsieh, Arbitration Falling Out of Vogue, LAWYERS USA, Mar. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.cpradr.org/DesktopModules/iBN%20News%2OArticlesDownload.aspx?Attachment
ID=120; Barry Richard, Corporate Litigation: Arbitration Clause Risks, NAT'L. L. J., June 14,
2004.
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then it will be. Even if they can't agree on the identity of a decision-
maker or makers, they often can agree to limit the universe of poten-
tial arbitrators to individuals with particular characteristics, such as,
"member of the North Carolina bar," or "retired federal judge," or
"licensed architect," or "ten years of employment in the casualty in-
surance industry." A time-tested strategy for giving parties some con-
trol over who decides their dispute is to allow each party to appoint
one arbitrator, and have those two arbitrators choose a third; the par-
ties can also specify in their arbitration agreement whether such party-
appointed arbitrators will be neutral or non-neutral. The major na-
tional providers, such as AAA, JAMS, and the International Institute
for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR) (formerly know as the
Center for Public Resources), as well as many regional and local orga-
nizations, maintain extensive panels of accomplished attorneys, re-
tired judges, and other professionals.
Those providers typically have procedures in which the parties are
given a list of multiple available arbitrators along with their curricu-
lum vitae. Each party can strike a specified number of candidates and
rank the remainder in order of preference. Candidates with the high-
est composite preference rankings are appointed as arbitrators.
Biographies for most arbitrator candidates are publicly available,
often online. In many cases, parties can search databases of arbitrators
by fields of expertise, languages spoken, professional experience, and
bar memberships. Upon request, providers usually furnish references
for each potential arbitrator. Many large law firms maintain databases
recording the firm's past experience with various arbitrators. Even in
firms without such databases, partners generally seek comments on
potential arbitrators from other attorneys.
In short, arbitrating parties can and do choose the decision-makers,
or at least make informed choices among the neutrals offered by prov-
iders on "strike-and-rank" lists.
B. Customizing the Process for Each Case (Grade = B)
Parties in commercial arbitration have the ability to tailor the arbi-
tration for each individual case. While all major providers have at
least one set of rules for commercial arbitration, all of these organiza-
tions allow parties to supplant those rules with their own, party-agreed
procedures. 9
9. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES Rule 1(a) (2007);
JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES Rule 2 (2007); CPR PROCE-
DURES & CLAUSES: NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION RULES Rule 1.1 (2007).
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Thus, the parties may determine in their arbitration agreement the:
- specific disputes or kinds of disputes which are (or are not)
arbitrable;
- sort of arbitration to be used (i.e. standard, high/low, or final of-
fer arbitration);
- number of arbitrators to hear the case;
- neutrality of these arbitrators;
- rules of procedure to be followed;
- law to govern the arbitration process;
- law to govern the merits of the dispute;
- applicable rules of evidence (if any);
- scope of discovery (if any);
- motions to be permitted (if any);
- setting (time and place) of the arbitration hearing
- time afforded to each party at the hearing;
- witnesses or kinds of witnesses to be called (or not permitted);
- type of direct testimony to be presented (either orally or in
writing);
- exhibits to be permitted;
- remedies the arbitrators may or may not award;
- nature of the award: either a statement of reasons (a reasoned
award), or only the amount or type of relief awarded (a bare
award);
- deadline for issuance of the award;
- whether attorney's fees may be or must be awarded;
- allocation of the fees and expenses for the arbitrators and pro-
vider organization;
- ability to appeal the award; and
- other details of the arbitration process.
Unfortunately, in a high percentage of cases, parties do not take
advantage of this opportunity to customize the arbitration process.
Rather, most commercial contracts contain a "plain vanilla" off-the-
shelf arbitration clause providing few details as to how the arbitration
will be conducted. This typically happens because the transactional
lawyers finalizing the deal are not well-informed about the arbitration
process or do not want to derail the deal by dwelling on potential
disputes. Thus, these attorneys throw in an arbitration clause from
some other contract at the last minute. This leaves the selected arbi-
trator(s) with the unenviable job of filling in the blanks concerning the
discovery and motions to be allowed, the date and length of the hear-
ing, and other process details.
If the parties appear at the preliminary conference with a joint
agreement for an expansive process with extensive discovery, as fre-
quently happens, the arbitrators are forced to accept that agreement
unless they can persuade the parties to scale it down. If the parties
disagree as to how the arbitration should proceed, as also happens
2009]
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frequently, the party with the most expansive requests usually ends up
getting all or most of what it wants. (The result occurs because the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and most state statutes provide for
vacatur if the arbitrator refuses to consider material and pertinent evi-
dence. 10 Thus, counsel will argue (with some force) that if they are
denied the opportunity to gather evidence, then they will have been
effectively denied the opportunity to present that evidence to the
arbitrators.)
Assigning a grade to how well this benefit is achieved is problematic
because the opportunity for customization is clearly available but
rarely utilized. Fair minded parties, on pondering this truth, might ad-
mit, as did Cassius, that "the fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but
in ourselves."11 However, since providers have contributed to this
problem by not offering parties enough templates to choose from, a B
is the most appropriate grade.
C. Flexibility of the Adjudicative Process (Grade = A)
The adjudicative process in commercial arbitration is much more
flexible than in litigation. Arbitrators can and do hold hearings in mul-
tiple locations. This facilitates the receipt of evidence from non-party
witnesses, and witnesses within the employ or control of the parties,
when numerous important witnesses are located in various places
(e.g., when the parties' offices or production facilities are situated in
different states). Arbitration witnesses can and do testify by phone
from remote locations. (The author, sitting as an arbitrator at hearings
in Washington, DC, has received telephonic or videoconference testi-
mony from witnesses in North Carolina, Texas, California, Japan,
Switzerland, and Korea.) Arbitrators can and do employ other tech-
niques seldom used in litigation, including: receipt of direct testimony
in writing; sequencing hearings; receiving testimony from related wit-
nesses through group presentations; requiring experts to testify in the
presence of each other and respond to questions from their opposite
number; and suspending hearings for substantial periods to allow par-
ties to gather evidence on unanticipated issues or developments. Arbi-
tration clearly deserves an A for achieving this benefit.
D. Privacy of the Adjudicative Process (Grade = A)
Parties can certainly achieve greater privacy in arbitration than in
litigation. In arbitration, unlike litigation, no public record is available
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
11. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act I, sc. 2.
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for inspection by anyone who asks. Arbitration hearings are not open
to the public. Moreover, if arbitrating parties choose to restrict the
extent to which their proceedings may be divulged to non-parties,
those contractual agreements are enforceable by arbitrators and
courts in the same manner as other parts of their contract.
However, the parties do have to agree on such restrictions. Unlike
mediation, in which the confidentiality of the process is often decreed
by statute, no such statutes regarding arbitration exist. Neither the
FAA, 12 nor the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA),13 nor the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) 14 mandates that arbitration pro-
ceedings be private or confidential. Thus, privacy of the adjudicative
process, unobtainable in litigation, is obtainable in arbitration if the
parties make it part of their arbitration agreement, as they often do.
Arbitration gets an A on this item.
E. Accessibility of the Tribunal (Grade = A)
For a variety of reasons, counsel in court cases generally do not
have quick and easy access to the judge handling their case. Most state
and federal trial judges have heavy dockets (the author's was 750
cases in his last civil assignment), spend much of their time in the
courtroom, and have little time (or inclination) to confer with counsel
between court appearances. Some judges are reluctant to hold confer-
ence calls with counsel, feeling uncomfortable with that setting and
the absence of a record of the discussion. Some judges hold periodic
status hearings with counsel, but these hearings are generally set well
in advance and involve time-consuming trips to court. As a result,
communications between counsel and the tribunal in litigation gener-
ally occur either in the courtroom or through written submissions
(e.g., motions, oppositions, briefs, and, for those judges who allow it,
letters). Some judges respond very quickly to such communications,
while many do not.
Arbitration surely earns an A for delivering greater accessibility to
the tribunal than in litigation. Many, if not most, commercial arbitra-
tors discourage formal motions regarding discovery and case manage-
ment matters, and instead direct counsel to promptly schedule a
12. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
13. The Uniform Arbitration Act was promulgated in 1955 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Thirty-five states subsequently adopted it in toto, and
fourteen states adopted substantially similar legislation. In 2000 the Commissioners adopted the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act which has, to date, been adopted, wholly or partially, by eigh-
teen states.
14. UNIF. ARBrrRATION Acr § 7 (2000).
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conference call through the assigned case manager. Problems often
get resolved in this call, with a follow-up order to memorialize the
ruling. Even if post-conference-call submissions are required, these
submissions can be made and reviewed quickly. Once the arbitrators'
attention is called to a particular obstacle in the path of a final deci-
sion, they generally deal with it promptly; arbitrators feel a duty to
facilitate the expedited resolution for which they were appointed, and
it is not in their self-interest to gain a reputation for slowing down
arbitration proceedings by being unreachable or unresponsive.
Arbitration also offers counsel greater "accessibility" during the
hearing. Arbitrators' greater approachability is symbolized by where
they sit-usually on the same level as counsel, not on a raised
"bench." During the hearing, arbitrators frequently ask questions of
counsel and witnesses, identify matters that require clarification, and
ask counsel to focus on particular issues. They may request counsel to
supply additional evidence, arguments, or briefs on certain matters.
Some arbitrators give counsel a list of questions to address in their
final arguments. Some arbitrators draft awards for comment before
issuing a final award. The process of arbitration is typically more inter-
active than litigation, which allows parties to shape their presentations
to supply the information the decision-makers need to reach a fair and
sound decision.
F. Responsive and Helpful Case Administration (Grade = A)
Regrettably, clerks' offices in many U.S. courts are staffed with
overworked, underpaid, and unmotivated personnel who have little
interest in helping counsel determine the number of document copies
to be filed, the location of forms for preparing subpoenas, the cost of
filing or witness fees, and the location and dates of particular court
proceedings. Clerks are, after all, government employees performing
tedious and repetitive tasks, often under serious budgetary and time
pressures, for an agency that essentially operates without competitors.
Complaints about the lack of civility, unresponsiveness, and incompe-
tence of clerk's offices are unfortunately quite common.
By contrast, arbitration providers pride themselves on delivering
top quality administrative services to clients. Case managers and other
staff are generally well-paid, and trained and regularly evaluated on
their ability to deliver efficient, responsive, and user-friendly adminis-
trative services. Like the airline captain who announces "we know you
have choices in travel," providers know their customers have choices.
Therefore, the quality of service is a high priority.
[Vol. 7:499
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While lapses occur, most parties are generally pleased with the ad-
ministration of commercial arbitrations. For example, JAMS customer
surveys consistently show high marks for case administration services.
Presumably, other major providers receive similar feedback. The au-
thor's own experience observing the performance of clerk's offices
versus the performance of commercial arbitration case managers
leaves no doubt about the superiority of the latter. A grade of A is
warranted here.
G. Fair and Just Results (Grade = A)
Arbitration originated from villagers entrusting their disputes to a
group of elders or wise men, and merchant guilds enlisting exper-
ienced and knowledgeable members to resolve disputes within their
ranks. Today, many parties use arbitration because they think they
will get more informed decisions from experienced arbitrators with
expertise in their particular industry, trade, or profession. Others
choose arbitration because they believe retired judges and distin-
guished attorneys have the intellectual firepower to understand their
cases, and the time and incentive (of attracting future business on the
basis of a reputation for outstanding decisions) to render fair, thought-
ful, and well-supported awards.
Commentators report that most parties regard commercial arbitra-
tion decisions as typically fair and well-supported. 15 JAMS, which con-
ducts a confidential, biannual survey of its customers, consistently
receives high marks for the quality of its arbitration hearings and
awards. AAA reports similar results from client evaluations.
Of course, occasional awards seem ill-considered or unsound. How-
ever, in the author's experience as a civil litigator and judge, the inci-
dence of such decisions is much greater from juries and judges than
from arbitrators.
One complaint voiced with regularity is that arbitrators tend to
"split the baby" to avoid alienating parties or counsel who might con-
sider using that arbitrator in a future matter. A study published by the
AAA reveals that this complaint is unfounded. 16 In that study, 31% of
claimants were awarded 0% of their claim and 35% were awarded
100% of their claim.17 Of the remaining 34% of the cases, the results
were widely distributed, with awards ranging from 10% to 90% of the
15. Burr, supra note 4; Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, U.S. Corporate Counsel Litigation Trends
Survey Results (2004).
16. Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not "Split the Baby:" Empirical
Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. OF Ir'L ARBITRATION 573-78 (2001).
17. Id.
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amount claimed. 18 A similar study of 4,794 awards shows that nearly
three out of four claimants were awarded either 0-20% or 81-100% of
the amount claimed. 19 Thus, empirical evidence shows that only a
small percentage of arbitration cases result in an award near the mid-
dle of the amount in controversy.
However, one must realize that a decision adopting neither of the
outcomes urged by competing parties is not necessarily unwarranted.
Frequently, the opposite is true. Many cases reach arbitration follow-
ing the failure of extensive efforts, through negotiation and mediation,
to settle the dispute. Often settlement is not achieved because the dis-
pute is not a "black and white" matter, but rather one in which a good
deal of merit exists for each side's position. In such situations, awards
lying between the extreme positions advocated by each side may be
the soundest decision possible, not self-interested attempts to curry
favor with all participants. Parties are less likely to attribute such deci-
sions to "baby splitting" if the award is accompanied by a cogent
statement of reasons. Client surveys by JAMS and AAA show that
parties and counsel generally respect arbitrators who conduct fair
hearings and thoughtfully consider all evidence and arguments, even if
the award does not come out as they hoped.
In short, the ability of commercial arbitration to deliver results that
its customers generally consider fair and just rates an A.
H. Finality (Grade = B)
Because, under both the FAA and the RUAA, grounds for vacating
arbitration awards are very limited and do not include errors of fact or
law,20 the incidence of vacatur is historically extremely low. The result
is that arbitration awards are the final and binding outcomes in a very
high percentage of commercial disputes. Some erosion in that bulwark
began a few years ago as courts declared that, while an ordinary error
of fact or law would not support vacatur of an award, a "manifest
disregard of law" might result in vacatur. 21 While manifest disregard
of law clearly connotes a higher threshold than a mere error of law,
exactly how much higher remains unclear. (It is also hard to square
this ground for vacatur with the traditional notion that arbitrators,
who may be non-lawyers, were not required to decide a dispute pre-
cisely as a court would but could employ their common sense and ex-
18. Id.
19. Results cited in Keer & Naimark, supra note 16.
20. 9 U.S.C. § 10; UNIt. ARBrrRATnON Acr § 7 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182, 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
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perience to arrive at what they considered a fair result under all
relevant circumstances.)
Another recent development affecting finality is the effort by some
parties to expand the statutory grounds for appeal by agreeing that
other grounds (e.g., errors of law) will warrant vacatur in their case.
Initially, federal courts split regarding whether parties arbitrating
under the FAA could enlarge its stated grounds for vacatur. However,
in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that such expansion of the FAA was impermissible, and that
manifest disregard of law was not an authorized ground for vacatur. 22
Yet, in the same opinion, the Court suggested that vacatur grounds
beyond those in FAA § 10 might be available if enforcement of
awards was being sought under state statutory or common law.23 And
in some states, these grounds are available.24 Manifest disregard of
law is still sometimes considered as a possible basis for vacatur. 25
It is too early to tell whether the foregoing developments will sub-
stantially undermine the traditional finality of arbitration awards. A
2004 study of published state and federal decisions on motions to va-
cate during a ten month period found that such motions were granted
in six out of sixty-one federal cases (i.e., about 10% of the time), while
state courts in California, New York, and Connecticut ordered vacatur
in nineteen of sixty-four cases (about 30%).26 Compare these numbers
to a Department of Justice study which found that, in state court con-
tract cases in which notices of appeals were filed during 2001-2005 in
46 large counties, reversals were ordered in 16.7% of the cases in
which plaintiffs were appellants and 22.5% of the cases in which de-
fendants were appellants.27 However, such statistics must be viewed
with caution. The vacatur study by Mills et al. involved a very small
sample (both in the number of cases and duration of time analyzed),
and only considered published decisions; many denials of motions to
vacate are likely issued via unpublished orders. Most importantly,
neither study discusses the percentage of instances in which a losing
22. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
23. Id. at 1406.
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-12 (West 1999); Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190
P.3d 586 (Cal. 2008).
25. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009).
26. Lawrence R. Mills, J. Lani Bader, Thomas J. Brewer & Peggy J. Williams, Dispute Resolu-
tion: Vacating Arbitration Awards, Disp. REs. MAG. Summer 2005, at 5.
27. THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 2001 SUPPLEMENTAL SURVEY OF CIVIL APPEALS: APPEALS
FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES, 2001-2005 4 (2006).
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party in arbitration or litigation chose not to appeal or seek vacatur,
presumably out of a belief that such an effort would be futile.
Given the inconclusiveness of the data available thus far, the most
that can be said reliably is that some diminution exists, to an unknown
extent, in the finality of arbitration awards. That situation seems most
appropriately to call for a grade of B.
I. Less Cost than Litigation (Grade = C)
Until recently, little doubt existed that commercial arbitration was
cheaper than commercial litigation. Discovery usually generates the
largest part of total attorney's fees in litigation, and arbitration pro-
ceeded with little or no discovery. Moreover, arbitration hearings (in
which formal foundations and other evidentiary requirements are usu-
ally laid aside, exhibits introduced en masse, and testimony taken
more quickly through written submissions or streamlined examina-
tions omitting the rhetoric and show often included for jury effect in
court examinations) can be concluded more quickly than trial and re-
duce attorney's fees. As recently as five years ago, a Corporate Legal
Times survey of in-house attorneys found that 59% of respondents
thought arbitration was less expensive than litigation.28 A survey of
senior corporate counsel conducted by an independent research firm
for the Fulbright & Jaworski law firm produced similar results.29
However, the last five years have witnessed acceleration of a trend
in which parties in more large commercial arbitrations, particularly so-
called "bet the company" cases seek to arbitrate the matter in essen-
tially the same way they would litigate it, with wide-ranging (some-
times massive) discovery; extensive motions practice, including
multiple summary disposition motions; protracted hearings including
thousands of pages of exhibits; and post-hearing briefs that are hun-
dreds of pages long. In essence, such parties seek to combine the first
eight benefits of arbitration discussed above with federal court proce-
dures that allow for virtually unlimited discovery and presentation of
evidence.
The driving forces behind this trend and its many consequences are
considered in a variety of publications.30 The best analysis appears in a
forthcoming article by Thomas Stipanowich, former CPR President
and now William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution and Aca-
28. Burr, supra note 4, at 45.
29. Fulbright & Jaworski, supra note 15.
30. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1, 4 n.4 (forthcoming Jan. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1297526 (citing Is Arbitra-
tion on the Way Out?, CONSTR. L. Oct. 2001, at 1).
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demic Director of the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution of Pep-
perdine University Law School.31 One consequence of the trend is an
increase in the cost of commercial arbitration. While no reliable data
about the exact magnitude of that increase is available, a significant
portion of arbitration participants and observers believe arbitration
now costs about as much as litigation.
Despite some predictions of arbitration's imminent demise, 32 no
convincing evidence demonstrates that increases in the cost of com-
mercial arbitration have led to a decline in its use vis-A-vis litigation.
The 2008 Fulbright & Jaworski litigation study reports that the num-
ber of U.S. companies that were parties to arbitrations involving more
than $20 million declined from 13% in 2007 to 7% in 2008. 33 How-
ever, one data point does not necessarily indicate a trend, and the
study also fails to report whether the percentage of companies with
arbitrations below $20 million increased or decreased from 2007 to
2008. Moreover, a different study shows a decline during this period in
the number of trials in state and federal courts.34 The explanations for
these findings are far from clear. One potential explanation is that the
veritable explosion in the use of mediation to settle commercial dis-
putes has reduced the volume of both arbitration and litigation.
Without attempting to characterize its true extent or predict its pos-
sible effects, a widespread perception exists that the costs of commer-
cial arbitration and litigation are now essentially equal. Assuming
arguendo that this perception is true, the grade for the benefit of re-
duced costs is C.
J. Faster Results than Litigation (Grade = B)
The same trend increasing the cost of commercial arbitration has
also increased the time it takes to get from filing to award in many
cases. Parties believing that arbitration and litigation cost the same
also believe that it takes the same amount of time to reach a decision
in each.35 Again, no published data supports this belief. However, as
31. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The "New Litigation," 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (forth-
coming Jan. 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1297526.
32. Leslie A. Gordon, Clause for Alarm, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 19.
33. Fulbright & Jaworski, Fifth Annual Litigation Trends Survey Findings: Directions and Dy-
namics (2008), available at http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/5thLitigationTrends
Webseminarlo-28.pdf.
34. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Fed-
eral and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004).
35. Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 Disp. RES. J. 37
Feb.-Apr. 2003; Benjamin J.C. Wolf, Note: On-line But Out of Touch: Analyzing International
Dispute Resolution Through the Lens of the Internet, 14 CARDOZO J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 281, 306
(2006).
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in the preceding section addressing costs, the author will assume this
belief is true.
Even so, as discussed above,36 despite some erosion in the finality of
arbitration awards, arbitration awards are still the end of the line in
more cases than trial court judgments. In cases where a motion to va-
cate is entertained, it takes less time for a single trial judge to decide
such motions than it does to assemble a trial record and briefs and
wait for three or more judges (in a busy appellate court) to decide an
appeal in litigation.
Hence, even if the time to award or judgment is equal, the total
time to a final resolution in the aggregate of commercial arbitrations is
undoubtedly less than the time to a final resolution in the aggregate of
commercial litigations. Thus, a grade of B for this benefit is most
accurate.
IV. THE OVERALL REPORT CARD
The assessments in Part III yield the following composite results:
6 A's
3 B's
1C
Reasonable observers should regard those grades as constituting a
pretty good "Report Card" for any decisional process involving a
widely disparate group of (sometimes contentious) persons seeking to
resolve complex disputes with high stakes. Indeed, in a university that
weights grades D through A with the numbers 1 - 4, respectively,
these grades would give commercial arbitration a Grade Point Aver-
age of 3.5 and a place on the Dean's List!
Yet, there is clearly room for improvement. What might be done to
bring the B and C grades up to A's?
A. Customizing the Arbitration Process
While most arbitration participants recognize the value of arbitrat-
ing cases according to procedures best suited to each case, some par-
ticipants feel that customization while the dispute resolution
procedure is being written into the transactional contract is an unreal-
istic goal. These participants suggest it is better to make these process
decisions once a concrete dispute arises, so everyone knows the exact
dispute at issue and can customize the process in the most informed
way. The trouble with this approach is that by the time a concrete
36. See supra Part III.H.
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dispute arises, the parties are furious with each other, highly suspi-
cious of anything suggested by the other side, and very reluctant to
give up any procedural options that might later come in handy. More-
over, once a concrete dispute exists, the parties may have very differ-
ent interests in how the arbitration is conducted. Parties seeking
damages want little discovery and the earliest hearing date possible.
Defending parties want lengthy discovery and are in no rush to have a
hearing that could cause them to part with money in their possession.
Thus, while experienced and knowledgeable counsel on both sides
can sometimes get their clients to agree to reasonable and expeditious
arbitration procedures once they are embroiled in a dispute, often
they cannot. Sometimes the parties do reach agreement but the agree-
ment is for needlessly expensive, wasteful, and ill-suited procedures
for the case at hand.
Thus, in this author's view, the better time to customize the arbitra-
tion process under a business contract is before any particular dispute
arises, and before the parties know whether they will be a claimant or
a respondent and whether they would profit most from an expansive
or restrictive process. At that juncture, the parties do not know whose
ox will be gored and are less able to game the system in their favor.
However, the parties can predict with reasonable confidence the prin-
cipal kinds of disputes that may arise. Then, with a little maturity and
some bargaining, they should be able to arrive at a process or multiple
processes that both sides consider fair and efficient for the kinds of
disputes identified.
For the customization of commercial arbitration to substantially in-
crease, three things need to happen.
First, the education of transactional attorneys and business persons
concerning the adverse consequences of not detailing, before disputes
arise, the arbitration process they want must increase. These arbitra-
tion customers need to understand, as one corporate general counsel
recently put it, "[i]f you simply provide for arbitration under [standard
rules] without specifying in detail ... how discovery will be handled
... you will end up with a proceeding similar to litigation. ' 37
Second, providers need to develop and make available a broad ar-
ray of template arbitration clauses that can easily be adapted for use
in multiple types and sizes of disputes. At a minimum three templates
37. James Bender, General Counsel, Williams Company, Remarks at The Torch Is Passed,
Corporate Counsel Panel Discussion, Annual Meeting, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution
(Jan. 29-30, 2004), cited in Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth
and Impact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution" 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 843, 895 n.202
(2004).
2009]
518 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
should be available: one providing for a very expansive arbitration
process, one for a very restrictive process, and one for something in
between.
Third, companies need to have the willpower to look at the availa-
ble templates (or a design of their own) and chose which template to
include in their contracts. That choice could even include prescribing
different arbitration models for disputes of different types or sizes.
B. Finality
The Supreme Court's decision in the Hall Street Associates case dis-
cussed above should make clear to all federal courts that they may
vacate arbitration awards only on the grounds set forth in FAA § 10.38
Thus, at present, inroads on finality are likely to occur primarily in
arbitrations conducted under state statutes. State legislators could
block such inroads by placing explicit statements in their statutes that
the state courts may vacate arbitration awards only on the grounds set
forth in their statute. State judges could strictly enforce such provi-
sions. Even where a state statute contains no such express exclusion of
vacatur grounds not included in the statute, as, indeed, the FAA does
not, state judges could follow the Supreme Court's lead and construe
their statutes to effect such exclusion.
Of course, state legislators and judges are unlikely to take these ac-
tions unless they recognize that arbitration is a process involving dif-
ferent tradeoffs than litigation. Legislators and judges must appreciate
that if finality (one of its key characteristics) is taken away, many mat-
ters now being arbitrated are likely to come pouring back into the
courts again, thereby setting back years of efforts in this country to
reduce civil litigation delay and backlog. This message needs to be
widely communicated by those engaged in commercial arbitration, law
school professors, legal scholars, and commentators. Judges and legis-
lators who believe that strict finality may be appropriate (even salu-
tary) in arbitration between commercial entities but troublesome in
adhesion contracts imposed on consumers, employees, and similar
parties need to be taught that it is possible and appropriate to make
distinctions between such different kinds of arbitrations. It is not nec-
essary to "toss out the baby with the bath water" when seeking to
protect the interests of those who did not freely elect to utilize a sys-
tem in which finality is an important cornerstone.
38. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008); 9 U.S.C. § 10.
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C. Reducing the Time and Cost of Arbitration
Achieving the improvements in finality and customization discussed
above will greatly reduce the time and cost of commercial arbitration.
Better training of arbitrators (particularly the chairs of tribunals in
complex cases) in managing arbitrations efficiently and effectively,
and working with counsel to trim unnecessarily costly and time-con-
suming procedures will also effect major improvements in this area. A
discussion of all of these management techniques is outside the scope
of this article, but helpful guidance is available in various practice
guides. 39 In addition, many organizations such as the ABA, the Col-
lege of Construction Lawyers, various law schools, and providers (like
AAA, JAMS, and CPR) offer training programs and conferences to
increase awareness of current issues in commercial arbitration and
techniques for addressing these issues.
Beyond such worthwhile steps lies the question of whether the
model of commercial arbitration currently practiced, with some modi-
fications to fit particular cases, should be substantially rethought. Are
there ways in today's era of instant communication, corporate consoli-
dation, and economic belt-tightening to reinvent commercial arbitra-
tion or make bold changes in the way it operates? In October 2009,
the College of Commercial Arbitrators will host a "National Summit
on Business-to-Business Arbitration" that will bring together distin-
guished members of the four main constituencies in arbitration (par-
ties, advocates, providers, and arbitrators) to develop protocols that
each group can employ to make such arbitration dramatically more
expeditious and economical.
V. CONCLUSION
Oliver Wendell Holmes stated the life of the law is not logic but
experience. 40 Now that parties have considerable experience in this
country with commercial arbitration, the opportunity to improve an
already very good process even further lies at the doorstep. Hopefully,
we will take up this challenge, and preserve an important and distinc-
tive mode of dispute resolution for years to come.
39. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR Busi-
NESS USERS (Thomas J. Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell eds., 2001); THE COLLEGE OF COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Curtis E. von
Kann, James M. Gaitis & June R. Lehrman eds., Juris Net 2006).
40. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (Dover Publications 1991) (1881).
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